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Internal Audit and Financial Reporting Quality in the Public Sector
SUMMARY
Using a unique set of hand-collected data, this study investigates the association of (1) the
presence of an Internal Audit Function (IAF) and (2) the use of quality assurance programs for
the IAF with financial reporting quality in public sector organizations. Specifically, I examine if
the presence of IAFs and the use of quality assessments therein is associated with the presence of
financial statement audit reportable conditions and restatements in municipalities in the U.S.
Results indicate that both the presence of an IAF and use of external quality programs therein are
positively associated with financial statement audit reportable conditions related to internal
control (significant deficiencies). Findings also suggest that the presence of an IAF is negatively
associated with restatements in U.S. municipalities with populations over 100,000 at significant
levels. The use of quality assurance programs for the IAF has no effect on the occurrence of
restatements. The study’s findings provide insights on IAF influence over financial statement
reporting quality in the public sector and suggest further research is necessary. Results should be
of interest to standard setters, regulators, and pubic-sector leadership as they attempt to improve
governmental financial reporting quality and transparency.

Key Words: Internal auditing, internal audit quality, external assessments, financial reporting
quality, audit reportable conditions, restatements
Data availability: Please contact the author.
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Internal Audit and Financial Reporting Quality in the Public Sector
INTRODUCTION
In this study, I examine the relationships of the existence and quality of an Internal Audit
Function (IAF) with financial reporting quality in public sector organizations. Specifically, I
investigate whether the presence and quality of the IAF indicated by external quality assessments
and improvement program (QAIP) in public sector organizations is associated with financial
restatements and/or financial weakness disclosures. Use of QAIP and the public sector provide a
unique and unexplored proxy and setting for investigation (The IIA, 2012a).
The importance of the IAF’s role in corporate governance and financial reporting quality
is acknowledged by academics, stock exchanges, regulators, and external auditors. Cohen et al.
(2004) highlight the importance of the IAF for high quality financial reporting in the post
Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) environment. The New York Stock Exchange requires that its listed
companies maintain an IAF (NYSE, 2003) while NASDAQ filed a proposed rule in 2013 to
require its listed companies to maintain an IAF (Securities and Exchange Commission 2013a).1
These rules were generally well-received by external auditors. For example, Grant Thornton
(2013, 1) states that “We believe that the periodic evaluation and testing of controls by an
internal audit function … can enhance a company’s system of internal control over time.” As the

1

Although NASDAQ later withdrew the proposed rule change, it did so to fully consider the 42 comment letters it
received regarding the proposal (Securities and Exchange Commission 2013b). The comment letters can be found at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-nasdaq-2013-032/nasdaq2013032.shtml.
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American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA 2014) indicates through regulation,
especially post-SOX, standard setters encourage the use of the IAF to help improve financial
reporting quality. The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission
(COSO) also makes a similar recommendation (AICPA 2014; COSO 2013).
While much attention is given to the financial reporting quality of publicly-traded
companies, the public sector is an important part of the economy as well, as public sector
spending accounts for approximately 25% of U.S. Gross Domestic Product (The World Bank,
2015). The occurrence of restatements within the public sector is not inconsequential in
frequency or magnitude (Baber et al., 2013a). In a sample of 207 municipalities from 2001-2004,
Baber et al. (2013a) find at least one restatement in over half of the cases. The authors also find
that those municipalities with at least one restatement face debt costs that are 35 basis points
higher than non-restatement municipalities (the mean amount of the debt issue is $23.75
million). Perhaps the most poignant example of a municipality restatement came in 2005 when
the City of San Diego announced a $641 million restatement (10% of its net assets) for fiscal
year 2002 (Greenblatt, 2005). Additionally, while internal audit has grown within the public
sector in recent years, very little research has examined IAFs in the public sector (van Gils,
2012). Also, most of this work is descriptive or qualitative in nature and is not specific to the
U.S. context (cf., Carhill et al., 1989; Coupland, 1993; Sterck et al., 2005; Sterck and Bouckaert,
2006).
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Reliance on IAFs within publicly-traded companies is a result of corporate scandals in
the late 1990s to early 2000s (Abdolmohammadi et al., 2006). SOX (2002), Section 404 requires
management of organizations to attest to the scope and adequacy of internal controls and
financial reporting procedures. IAFs are often tasked with the necessary compliance work to
assess the adequacy of these controls (Abdolmohammadi et al., 2006). While the same
attestation is not required of public sector organizations, public sector audit activities (both
internal and external) can help enhance the accountability and transparency of financial reporting
through financial audits (The IIA, 2012d). The public sector utilizes internal auditors for design
of internal controls and to provide additional monitoring that impacts financial reporting
(Peterson, 2014).
External assessments help ensure that IAFs conform to The IIA’s quality standards per its
International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing (The IIA, 2012a).
These standards promote the effectiveness and efficiency of the IAF. Since January 1, 2002 The
IIA’s standards require external assessments of the IAF to be performed “at least once every five
years, by a qualified, independent assessor or assessment team from outside the organization”
and “can be in the form of a full external assessment or a self-assessment verified by an
independent assessor” (The IIA, 2012e). Yet, the IIA’s Common Body of Knowledge (CBOK,
2010) survey of IIA membership found that only 39.7% of Chief Audit Executives (CAEs) state
that their organizations comply with Standard 1312 requiring external assessments (CBOK,
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2010).2 These evaluations are paid for by the assessed public sector organization and may be
performed by external assessors, such as external auditors, the IIA, consultants, peers, or in the
form of an internal assessment with external validation (The IIA, 2007)3. This finding suggests a
need for research on the efficacy of external assessments as an indicator of IAF quality.
This study provides insight on IAF contributions to financial reporting quality in public
sector organizations. A major role of internal audit within public service organizations is to
provide an independent appraisal and review service to determine and report on the degree of
control exercised over financial systems (Coupland, 1993). Regulators and standard setters may
use the results of this study to promote the importance of IAFs for a largely unexamined group of
organizations, municipalities. Finally, this study follows the guidance and call for research
regarding audit quality indicators from the Center for Audit Quality (2014)4.
Cohen et al. (2004) argue that the IAF is one of four cornerstones of corporate
governance, along with management, the board, and the external auditor. While studies
examining the relationships between the latter three and financial reporting quality are extensive,

2

Although CBOK (2010) finds that 28.4% of respondents state that their IAF is less than five years old, this still
leaves almost a third of IAFs that choose not to have an external assessment every five years. Another reason that
organizations may not comply with the standard is that the internal audit profession is unregulated (The IIA, 2007).
3
In a survey of U.S. organizations the IIA (2007) found that 67.6% received a full external review, 27.0%
performed a self-assessment with an independent validation, and 5.4% had a peer review. The details of the review
providers were not made available.
4
While the CAQ’s Approach to Audit Quality Indicators focuses on external audit, the high level key elements
stressed are firm leadership and tone at the top; auditor knowledge, experience, and workload; monitoring; and
auditor reporting. This list closely parallels the IAF quality determinants stressed in SAS65/128 and prior research
(e.g., Ege, 2015; Prawitt et al., 2009; and Lin et al., 2011). Thus, I argue that many of the same elements that
indicate high external audit quality also indicate high internal audit quality.
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the relationship between IAF quality and financial reporting quality has received limited
attention in the literature. Notable exceptions are Prawitt et al. (2009), Lin et al. (2011), and Ege
(2015). These studies use The IIA’s Global Audit Information Network (GAIN) survey data to
study the association between IAF characteristics and financial reporting quality for U.S. public
firms. Also, much of the research regarding the IAF and corporate governance/financial
reporting quality is qualitative in nature (Arena and Azzone, 2009; Mihret and Yismaw, 2007) or
focuses on external audit’s reliance on the IAF (Bame-Aldred et al., 2013; Gramling and Myers,
2006; Mihret and Admassu, 2011; Prawitt et al., 2011). To the author’s knowledge only one
study (Peterson, 2014) examines the IAF and financial reporting quality in the municipal setting,
and finds no association between the presence of an IAF in municipalities and reported material
weaknesses/significant deficiencies in internal controls.
My study extends Peterson (2014) by (1) identifying if IAFs are involved in financial
audits; (2) using the presence of external quality assessments as a proxy for deliberate attempts
to improve IAF quality; and (3) examining the effects of IAFs on restatements in the public
sector.
In a sample of U.S. municipalities with populations over 100,000, findings indicate a
significant positive relationship between the presence of an IAF and financial statement audit
reportable conditions related to internal control (significant deficiencies). Results also indicate
that the presence of an IAF is negatively associated with restatements. The use of quality
assurance programs for the IAF also has a significant positive relationship with audit reportable
7

conditions, but no relationship with restatements. For control variables, municipalities that are
deemed low risk have significantly fewer financial statement significant deficiencies in all
models, while municipalities with audit committees have significantly more financial statement
audit reportable conditions and restatements. Results for the remaining control variables are
either mixed or insignificant.
In the next sections I provide the research background and hypotheses, followed by the
research method, results, and conclusion and discussion.
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES
Literature Review
Prior research finds that high-quality accounting systems reduce information asymmetry
and promote capital markets efficiency (Beaver, 1981; Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman, 2011;
Healy and Palepu, 2001). The literature also stresses the importance of financial reporting
monitoring mechanisms for publicly traded firms (Baber et al., 2013a; Dechow et al., 1996).
Internal control systems and oversight are viewed as important elements of financial reporting
quality as they may predict, and even prevent, future accounting and financial reporting issues
(Rich and Zhang, 2014). Much of the prior research regarding the IAF’s role in corporate
governance focuses on publicly-traded and/or for-profit organizations. Internal auditing is also
important in the public sector as IAFs provide objective assessments of whether public resources
are managed responsibly and effectively to achieve intended results (The IIA, 2012d).
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The public sector can be described as a principal-agent relationship, where elected and
appointed officials (the agents) must periodically report to the public (principals) their use and
stewardship of resources, and the extent to which the public’s goals are met (The IIA, 2012d).
Principles of corporate governance in the public sector include accountability, transparency,
integrity, and equity. Through internal control and monitoring to ensure appropriate use of
resources and accurate reporting practices IAFs reduce the risks (e.g., moral hazard) inherent in a
principal-agent relationship. This is critical as stakeholder trust of public sector information and
action is eroded if it is not credible and reliable, thus undermining legitimacy and the ability to
govern (The IIA, 2012d).
Research on “New Public Management” (NPM) stresses the importance of the IAF in the
public sector (Sterck et al., 2005; van Gils, 2012). NPM is a set of theoretical and practical ideas
in the field of public management (Hood, 1989). Hood (1991: 3-4) defines it as “a shorthand
name for the set of broadly similar administrative doctrines which dominated the bureaucratic
reform agenda in many of the OECD countries from the late seventies.” Three of the seven
doctrines of NPM include; transparency, measurable standards and benchmarks of performance;
and a greater emphasis on the output controls (Hood, 1991). Some scholars see NPM as a hybrid
between new and old practices, and not a complete shift away from the “old” public management
mantra of input controls and procedures to output controls (Pollitt, 1995; Pollitt, 2002; Osborne
and Gaebler, 1993).

9

This research contributes to the NPM stream of literature in that it views the relationship
between IAFs and financial reporting outcomes is influenced by both input and output controls.
Public sector IAFs promote credibility, equity, transparency and appropriate behavior of public
sector officials (The IIA, 2012d). Two highly visible manifestations of this function are a public
sector organization’s financial statements and related audit findings, specifically restatements
and single audit reportable conditions, which I use in the current study.
Each year, public sector organizations undergo two types of audits, a financial statement
audit and a single audit. A financial statement audit considers the quality of the financial
reporting of the entity and includes tests of account balances as well as internal controls over
financial reporting. External auditors conduct financial statement audits in accordance with
auditing standards generally accepted in the U.S and the standards applicable to financial audits
contained in Government Auditing Standards, issued by the Comptroller General of the U.S
(GAO, 2011). Under a financial statement audit, the auditor expresses an opinion as to whether
the financial statements are prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles (GAAP) and reasonable assurance that the financial statements are free from material
misstatement.
A single audit is required under the Single Audit Act of 1984 (US Congress, 1984) and
Single Audit Act Amendments of 1996 (US Congress, 1996)5. The purpose of the single audit

5

Single audits are required for any non-federal entity that receives $300,000 or more in a year in federal awards,
while financial statement audits are required when an entity receives $500,000 or more. This includes states, local
governments, non-profit organizations, and institutions of higher education (OMB, 2003).
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(also called A-133 audit) is to ensure compliance with rules regarding the use of federal funds
and whether appropriate internal controls are in place therein per the U.S. Office of Management
and Budget (OMB, 2003b). As part of single audits, external auditors perform compliance and
internal controls tests to ensure compliance requirements are met, and that internal controls are in
place and designed properly to ensure compliance (Peterson, 2014). Reportable conditions are
noted in both the financial statements (material weaknesses, significant deficiencies, and material
noncompliance) and single audits (material weaknesses and significant deficiencies), denoting
that the internal controls in place are less than optimal.
Post-SOX, IAFs are expected to assess internal controls, help organizations follow
accounting standards, and report findings to boards and governing bodies. Effective public sector
IAFs strengthen governance by materially increasing citizens’ ability to hold their public sector
entities accountable. While external auditors provide assurance directly to the
stakeholders/shareholders regarding financial statements, the IAF provides assurance indirectly.
Agency theory can explain the independent role and responsibilities assigned to the IAF, and
there is a growing consensus that IAF truly helps solve the agency problem (Cohen et al., 2004;
Felix Jr. and Gramling, 2001; Sarens and Abdolmohammadi, 2011).
Existing literature suggests a positive relationship between the use of the IAF and
financial reporting quality in publicly-traded companies (e.g., Prawitt et al., 2009; Lin et al.,
2011; Ege, 2015). However, using a sample of U.S. municipalities, Peterson (2014) finds no
relationship between the presence of an IAF in municipalities and audit reportable conditions.
11

The author attributes this result to the inability to define the role of IAF in each of the
municipalities. A major difference between Peterson (2014) and my study is that I am able to
define the role of IAF for the municipalities in my sample.
In the public sector, IAFs assess policies and procedures and provide ways to improve
operational accountability, internal controls, and financial systems. IAFs also make
recommendations to enhance efficiency and effectiveness of municipal operations. In summary,
IAFs of municipalities:
“Review internal controls, processes, and systems to identify systemic weaknesses and
propose improvements” and “Internal auditors assess the adequacy of corporate
governance and the control environment; the effectiveness of processes to identify,
assess, and manage risks; the assurance provided by control policies, procedures, and
activities; and the completeness and accuracy of information and communication systems
and practices (The IIA, 2012d).”
Accordingly, I expect that the presence of an IAF that is involved with the financial
reporting process within public sector organizations leads to better internal controls, and thus a
lower likelihood that audit reportable conditions exist under financial statement audits. This
leads to my first hypothesis:
H1a:

The presence of an IAF that is involved in the financial reporting process is
negatively associated with the occurrence of financial statement audit reportable
conditions in public sector organizations.

Restatements are said to be a result of weak internal controls and are used as a proxy for
financial reporting quality in prior research that examines corporate governance and audit quality
(e.g., Abbott et al., 2004; Carcello et al., 2011; Francis, 2004; Kinney Jr et al., 2004; Larcker et
12

al., 2007). The Center for Audit Quality (2014) has recently released its approach to audit quality
indicators, which proposes the use of restatements as an indicator of low audit quality6. Public
sector and municipal financial reporting and information are used in public policy decisions
regarding financing, taxation, and resource allocation that significantly impact the economy
(Rich and Zhang, 2014), thus restatements are important to many stakeholders of these
organizations.
Prior research suggests that the need for restatements can be identified by the
organization itself, regulators, an independent auditor, or a combination therein. The company
can find misstatements through internal audits and other internal control procedures (Palmrose et
al., 2004). Research stresses that restatements in the context of poor oversight can be viewed as
evidence of control problems (Baber et al., 2013a), and finds that the presence of weak internal
controls is associated with a higher occurrence of restatements post-SOX (2002) (Krishnan and
Visvanathan, 2007). While the presence of an IAF is likely to lead to better controls around the
financial reporting process and prevent restatements, it is also possible that the presence of an
IAF leads to a greater likelihood of finding errors requiring restatements.
Municipality IAFs that perform financial audits assess the reliability of specific inputs
and outputs of the accounting process and resulting financial information, and also examine the
presentation of financial statements given accepted accounting principles (The IIA, 2012d). I

6
While the focus of the Center for Audit Quality (2014) report is external audit, many of the same principles noted
in the report apply to internal audit. Additionally, the IIA (2012d) notes that both internal and external auditors play
an important role in the assurance of public sector financial information.
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posit that municipalities with formal IAFs have fewer restatements due to errors than
municipalities without IAFs. Thus:
H1b:

The presence of an IAF that is involved in the financial reporting process is
inversely associated with the occurrence of restatements in public sector
organizations.

IAFs in the public sector encounter varying financial reporting and compliance rules,
performance indicators, and activities across jurisdictions. Thus, IAFs across different public
sector organizations may need to possess diverse skills, competencies, and specializations
(Carhill and Kincaid, 1989; The IIA, 2012d). This suggests that external quality reviews
(assessments) are particularly useful as they provide valuable insight to IAFs in the public sector,
and help improve quality therein (Carhill and Kincaid, 1989). IAFs of municipalities may
undergo two types of external quality reviews; (1) assessments of compliance with The IIA’s
standards and (2) assessments of compliance with Governmental Auditing Standards per the
Association of Local Government Auditors (ALGA).
The IIA’s standards state that “the chief audit executive (CAE) must develop and
maintain a Quality Assessment and Improvement Program” (The IIA, 2012e). The IIA further
states that external assessments are an integral part of these programs, are required every five
years, and should:



Cover all facets of the IAF’s activity.
Evaluate the IAF’s conformance with the Definition of Internal Auditing, the Code
of Ethics, and The IIA’s International Standards for the Professional Practice of
Internal Auditing.
14




Assess the efficiency and effectiveness of the internal audit activity.
Identify opportunities for improvement (The IIA, 2012b).

The IIA’s Quality Assessment Manual (The IIA, 2012c) prescribes the elements of the
IAF evaluated through external assessments and include compliance with IIA attribute,
performance, and code of ethics standards. These elements include IAF independence and
objectivity, proficiency and due professional care (attributes); managing the IAF, nature of IAF
work, engagement planning, work performance, communication, progress monitoring, and risk
management (performance); and a code of ethics (The IIA, 2012c). Results from an IIA (2007)
survey indicate that CAEs have their IAFs undergo an external assessment to provide
stakeholders evidence of the quality of the IAF and effectiveness of internal controls. This
suggests that external assessments do indeed improve IAF quality.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) issues Generally Accepted Auditing
Standards (GAGS), which includes requirements and guidance for a variety of public sector
organizations in the U.S. These standards must be followed by all professional auditors
conducting financial audits of government and non-profit organizations receiving federal funds
subject to the audit requirements of the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB, 2003a).
These audits are required every three years (GAO, 2011), and are very similar in purpose, scope
and execution as the aforementioned IPPF reviews (The IIA, 2012f). Thus, the effect of the IPPF
and GAGAS reviews are considered equals for the current research.
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Prawitt et al. (2009) directly examine the association between IAF quality and financial
reporting quality. The authors find a positive relationship between IAF quality and financial
reporting quality in publicly traded firms as measured by abnormal accruals and the likelihood of
just beating or meeting analyst forecast (Prawitt et al., 2009). Prawitt et al. (2012) extend this
research and find that financial reporting risk is higher in firms that outsourced their IAFs to their
Big N external auditors than those that outsourced their IAFs to other audit firms or kept the IAF
in-house.7 These studies rely on survey data and use IAF quality indicators as prescribed by
regulators. Lin et al. (2011) utilize similar survey data from The IIA to examine the relationship
between IAF quality and SOX (2002) section 404 material weaknesses. The authors expand the
IAF quality measure defined by SAS 65 to include IAF use of quality assurance techniques, and
whether the IAF grades audit engagements in their IAF quality proxy8. They find a negative
relationship between their IAF quality composite variable and disclosed material weaknesses.
They also find a positive relationship between two IAF quality procedures (IAF use of audit
engagement grading and follow up techniques) and disclosure of material weaknesses (Lin et al.,
2011). The authors suggest the latter finding to indicate a high quality IAF, which may lead to
better internal controls and a greater likelihood that errors are detected and reported as
restatements when necessary. Finally, Ege (2015) finds a negative association between a

7

Prawitt et al. (2012) control for IAF quality using a composite score that includes experience, certification, CAE
education, time spent on financial reporting, internal auditor training hours, and IAF size.
8
These quality assurance techniques include direct supervision; independent working paper review; audit client
feedback; peer review by fellow staff members, working paper checklists and tick lists, and management
participation.
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composite measure of IAF quality (internal auditor competence, independence/objectivity, IAF
financial work, and size) and management misconduct.9 Specifically, the author finds a lower
occurrence of financial reporting fraud, bribery, and misleading disclosure practices when IAF
quality is higher.
In summary, prior research indicates that IAF quality is positively associated with
financial reporting quality in publicly-traded firms. With the focus on internal control systems
from SOX (2002) section 404, the IAF’s role in the financial reporting process has grown (Zain
et al., 2006), as organizations tasked IAFs to design internal controls over financial reporting
(Carcello et al., 2005). Although the public sector is not under the purview of SOX (2002), the
use of the IAF for internal control and within the financial reporting process has also grown in
public sector organizations as well (Protiviti, 2008; The IIA, 2012d). Additionally, unlike forprofit companies, public sector organizations are service-oriented and generally not focused on
profitability and competitiveness (Carhill and Kincaid, 1989); making it more likely for IAF
focus to be on internal controls than consultancy activities. As strong internal controls are
suggested to prevent material misstatements, it is likely that higher quality IAFs create better
internal control systems that may prevent misstatements (Zain et al., 2006).

9

Ege’s (2015) uses the following items for each component; competence (experience, professional certifications and
training hours), independence (reporting line and IAF use as a management training ground), and IAF financial
work (percentage of time assisting external auditors). He also uses a factor analysis to create composite measure of
IAF competence and objectivity. His findings are consistent with the IIA’s definitions of both (competence is the
knowledge and skills required to perform job responsibilities, while objectivity refers to an unbiased mental attitude
toward audit matters).
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This leads to the following hypotheses:
H2a: Municipalities with IAFs that have undergone an external quality assessment are less
likely to have financial statement audit reportable conditions.
H2b: Municipalities with IAFs that have undergone an external quality assessment are less
likely to restate their financial statements.
RESEARCH METHOD
Sample
Municipalities included in this study are limited to those considered large (populations of
100,000 or more) by Government Accounting Standards Board Statement 34 (GASB, 1999),
based on U.S. Census Bureau City survey (United States Census Bureau, 2013). This is because
they must issue comprehensive annual financial reports that include; management’s discussion
and analysis, basic financial statements including government-wide financial statements and
fund financial statements, notes to the financial statements and additional required
supplementary information, as some states waive this requirement for cities with populations of
less than 100,000.10 The years covered by the sample are 2004-2014 (Post-SOX), and the sample
is limited to municipalities that have data for at least three consecutive years. Data for this study
is hand collected from individual municipality websites and comprehensive annual financial

10
Data from the U.S. census bureau shows 363 U.S. municipalities with estimated populations of 100,000 or greater
as of 2013 per https://www.census.gov/popest/data/cities/totals/2013/. I collected data for 100 of these for a total of
926 municipality years. I used a random number generator that I applied to the aforementioned list of 363
municipalities to select the sample.
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reports, the U.S. Census Bureau (2013 data), Auditanalytics.com, and GASB.org, all of which
are publicly available. Table 1 includes details of the sample by state. As shown, the sample
includes municipalities from 30 states.
[Insert Table 1 Here]
Dependent Variables
Table 2 provides definitions and measurements of all variables in the models.
[Insert Table 2 Here]
Financial Statement Audit Reportable Conditions (FSauditSDMW). Per U.S. Office of
Management and Budget guidelines (OMB 2012a, 2012b) auditors of public sector entities must
identify “reportable conditions”, which include deficiencies in internal controls when issues are
deemed significant enough to warrant disclosure. These are identified as either a material
weakness (MW) or signifncant deficiency (SD). As defined by the GAO (2011):
“A deficiency in internal control exists when the design or operation of a control does
not allow management or employees, in the normal course of performing their assigned
functions, to prevent, or detect and correct, misstatements on a timely basis. A material
weakness is a deficiency, or a combination of deficiencies, in internal control, such that
there is a reasonable possibility that a material misstatement of the entity’s financial
statements will not be prevented, or detected and corrected on a timely basis. A
significant deficiency is a deficiency, or a combination of deficiencies, in internal control
that is less severe than a material weakness, yet important enough to merit attention by
those charged with governance.”
I operationalize this with data from Audit Analytics. I use the reportable condition field
and code the variable FSauditSDMW as 1 if a reportable condition exists (SD or MW), 0 if not.

19

Restatements (Restatement). Following prior research (Baber et al., 2013a; Palmrose et
al., 2004) I identify restatements when the municipality comprehensive annual financial
statements refer11 to restatements or prior period adjustments (errors) and exclude restatements
due to implementation of GASB standards, reclassification between funds, changes in
accounting principles, and changes in accounting estimates.
Additional Analyses. In addition, auditors must identify if there exists material
noncompliance (MNC) by the auditee with applicable laws or federal grant requirements (GAO,
2011):
“A deficiency in internal control over compliance exists when the design or operation of
a control over compliance does not allow management or employees, in the normal
course of performing their assigned functions, to prevent, or detect and correct,
noncompliance with a type of compliance requirement of a federal program on a timely
basis. A material weakness in internal control over compliance is a deficiency, or
combination of deficiencies, in internal control over compliance, such that there is a
reasonable possibility that material noncompliance with a type of compliance
requirement of a federal program will not be prevented, or detected and corrected, on a
timely basis.”
In an additional analysis using data from Audit Analytics, I code the variable
FSauditMNC as 1 if MNC is noted, 0 if not for each municipality year.
For the annual single audit, reportable conditions include significant deficiencies and
material weaknesses. A material weakness (MW) is a significant deficiency that results in a
reasonable possibility that material noncompliance with a program requirement will occur

11

When identified in the comprehensive annual reports through reference within the financial statements or through
footnote disclosure.
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(GAO, 2011). A significant deficiency (SD) is a control deficiency that that is less severe than a
material weakness, but is important enough to merit attention by those charged with governance.
Significant deficiencies are identified with the variable SAuditSD, where 1 indicates a significant
deficiency exists, 0 if not. Material weaknesses are identified with the variable SAuditMW, where
1 indicates a material weakness exists, 0 if not.
Independent Variables
Presence of Internal Audit Function (IAFPresent). The presence of an internal audit
function is gathered from municipality websites and is coded as 1 if an IAF is present and 0 if
not.
Presence of External Quality Assessment in Current or Prior Year (EQAIPPresentPrior).
The presence of an external quality assessment of the IAF’s compliance with Governmental
Auditing Standards (GAS) or The IIA’s International Professional Practices Framework (IPPF)
Standards (The IIA, 2012a) in either the current year or any prior years within the sample period
for the particular municipality is coded as a 1, and 0 if not.
Control Variables
Following prior research I control for various organization, IAF, and other variables,
which are described below.12

12

Originally I planned to use whether or not the IAF of the municipality engaged in financial work. However, only
three municipalities (for a total of 18 municipality years) in my sample did not engage in financial work. These
cities are Independence (Missouri) Madison (Wisconsin), and Sacramento (California). Thus, I was unable to use
this as a variable in the study.
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State GAAP Requirements (GAAPState). Prior research suggests that restatements are less
likely in states that require GAAP accounting in the public sector and that state accounting
requirements may proxy for other forms of state oversight that influence financial reporting
practices and procedures (Baber and Gore, 2008). Following prior research that examines
financial reporting quality of public sector organizations, I control for states where the public
sector must follow GAAP (Baber and Gore, 2008; Baber et al., 2013a; Rich and Zhang, 2014)
and expect a negative relationship with the dependent variables.
External Auditor Variables (Big4Auditor and StateAuditor) Results from prior research
demonstrate that external auditor differences impact financial reporting quality. Generally, this
research suggests that Big-N auditors provide higher quality external audits than other private
firms, and thus help promote higher quality financial reporting (Blokdijk et al., 2006; Eshleman
and Guo, 2014; Francis, 2004). Consistent with prior research examining IAF quality and
financial reporting quality (Ege, 2015; Lin et al., 2011), as well as research regarding
municipalities and financial reporting quality (Baber et al., 2013a; Rich and Zhang, 2014), I
control for use of Big-4 versus non Big-4 auditors (Baber et al., 2013a; Peterson, 2014). Public
sector organizations may utilize state auditors or a private auditor. Some of the limited research
in this area finds that state auditors discover more financial reporting deficiencies than private
CPA firms (Jakubowski, 2008; Svara, 2002). Following Peterson (2014) I also control for the
presence of a state auditor. Higher-quality audits may either lead to better financial reporting
quality over time or an increased likelihood to find and report audit reportable conditions or
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restatements. Thus I do not make a directional prediction for the relationships between
Big4Auditor or StateAuditor and the dependent variables.
Low risk auditee (LowRiskAuditee). The U.S. Government Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) requires that external auditors of state and local government entities make a
determination of the auditee’s audit risk (OMB, 2003c). I control for municipality audit risk
(LowRisk) based on the external auditor’s classification and expect a negative relationship with
the dependent variables.13
Presence of an Audit Committee (ACPresent). The Government Finance Officers
Association (GFOA) recommends that municipalities in the U.S. form audit committees to
enhance the credibility of financial reporting (GFOA 2008). The Government Accountability
Office (GAO) stresses the importance of Audit Committees for municipalities (GAO, 1998). In
2003, the GAO required each governmental entity to designate an audit committee or similar

13

Per the OMB (2003b) the following is the criteria for a low-risk auditee. “An auditee which meets all of the
following conditions for each of the preceding two years (or, in the case of biennial audits, preceding two audit
periods) shall qualify as a low-risk auditee and be eligible for reduced audit coverage in accordance with §___.520:
(a) Single audits were performed on an annual basis in accordance with the provisions of this part. A non-Federal
entity that has biennial audits does not qualify as a low-risk auditee, unless agreed to in advance by the cognizant or
oversight agency for audit. (b) The auditor's opinions on the financial statements and the schedule of expenditures
of Federal awards were unqualified. However, the cognizant or oversight agency for audit may judge that an
opinion qualification does not affect the management of Federal awards and provide a waiver. (c) There were no
deficiencies in internal control which were identified as material weaknesses under the requirements of GAGAS.
However, the cognizant or oversight agency for audit may judge that any identified material weaknesses do not
affect the management of Federal awards and provide a waiver. (d) None of the Federal programs had audit
findings from any of the following in either of the preceding two years (or, in the case of biennial audits, preceding
two audit periods) in which they were classified as Type A programs: (1) Internal control deficiencies which were
identified as material weaknesses; (2) Noncompliance with the provisions of laws, regulations, contracts, or grant
agreements which have a material effect on the Type A program; or (3) Known or likely questioned costs that
exceed five percent of the total Federal awards expended for a Type A program during the year.”
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body to fulfill the financial oversight role (GAO 1999). Prior research stresses the importance of
ACs for corporate governance and the financial reporting process (Cohen et al., 2004). Research
considering IAF quality and its association with financial reporting controls for the presence of
an AC and/or AC characteristics (Ege, 2015; Lin et al., 2011; Prawitt et al., 2012; Prawitt et al.,
2009). While publicly traded firms in the U.S. must maintain an AC with at least one designated
accounting expert, no such requirement is present in the public sector. Rich and Zhang (2014)
find that the presence of an AC in municipalities leads to fewer internal control problems and are
thus less likely to experience financial reporting failures. Thus, I control for, and expect a
negative association between the presence of an AC and the dependent variables.
Form of Government (CouncilManager). Prior research suggests that financial reporting
quality is higher when the council-manager form is in place (Copley, 1992; Evans and Patton,
1983; 1987). Additional research suggests that municipalities organized according to the councilmanager model encounter fewer restatements (Baber et al., 2013a) and report fewer material
weaknesses in internal controls (Peterson, 2014). This is suggested to be a result of a stronger
emphasis on accountability and transparency under the council-manager system (Svara, 2002).
Thus, I control for form of government and expect a negative relationship between the presence
of a council-manager form of municipal government and the dependent variables.
City Council Election Variables (Staggered and TermLimit). Research that examines
corporate governance in municipalities uses staggered elections and term limits as control
variables. Staggered elections require at least two elections for citizens to replace a majority of
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the council, increasing the potential for entrenchment. Alternatively, staggered elections may
help ensure continuity of council knowledge, and may encourage more efficient operations
(Peterson, 2014). Term limits require officials to rotate out of office after a set number of
consecutive terms. Research finds that governors eligible for re-election perform better (Alt et
al., 2011), but also finds that entrenchment due to staggered elections may lead to internal
control problems (Baber et al., 2013b). Peterson (2014) finds mixed results when examining the
association between these variables and audit outcomes.14 Thus, I control for the presence of
both staggered elections (Staggered) and term limits (TermLimit) imposed on the city council of
the municipality but make no directional predictions for either variable.
Elected Finance Official (ElectedFinanceOfficial). I also control for whether the official
that oversees the finance department of municipalities is elected or appointed. As the
professional qualifications of elected versus appointed officials do not necessarily differ, the
primary difference is the presence of an election. Following prior research I do not make a
directional prediction of the association between this variable (FinanceOfficial) and my
dependent variables (Peterson, 2014).
Organization size (OrgSize). Prior research that examines the association between IAF
quality and accounting outcomes controls for organization size (Ege, 2015; Lin et al., 2011;
Prawitt et al., 2009). The literature regarding municipalities and financial reporting quality uses
population as a proxy for size (Baber et al., 2013a; Peterson, 2014; Rich and Zhang, 2014). Thus,

14

The audit outcomes are material weaknesses/significant deficiencies in internal controls.
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consistent with this research I control for size using the log of population, but make no
directional prediction.
Model Specification
The specification of dependent and independent variables identified above can be
modeled as binary logistic regressions, as follows:
FSauditSDMW = α+ 1IAFPresent + 2 GAAPstate + 3Big4Auditor + 4StateAuditor
+5Lowrisk 6ACpresent + 7CouncilManager + 8 Staggered + 9TermLimit
+ 10ElectedFinanceOfficial + 11OrgSize + 
(Model 1a)
Restatement = α+ 1IAFPresent + 2 GAAPstate + 3Big4Auditor + 4StateAuditor
+5Lowrisk 6ACpresent + 7CouncilManager + 8 Staggered + 9TermLimit
+ 10ElectedFinanceOfficial + 11OrgSize + 
(Model 1b)
FSauditSDMW = α+ 1EQAIPPresentPrior + 2 GAAPstate + 3Big4Auditor +
4StateAuditor +5Lowrisk 6 ACpresent + 7CouncilManager + 8Staggered
+ 9TermLimit + 10ElectedFinanceOfficial + 11OrgSize +  (Model 2a)
Restatement = α+ 1EQAIPPresentPrior + 2 GAAPstate + 3Big4Auditor +
4StateAuditor +5Lowrisk 6 ACpresent + 7CouncilManager + 8Staggered
+ 9TermLimit + 10ElectedFinanceOfficial + 11OrgSize +  (Model 2b)
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Tests of Hypotheses
Audit Reportable Conditions (FSauditSDMW). Table 3 contains descriptive statistics and
univariate results for the audit reportable conditions dependent variable FSauditSDMW. Overall
338 (38%) of the municipality years have a financial statement audit reportable condition (SD or
MW), while 558 (62%) do not. This level of audit reportable conditions (SD and MW) is
consistent with Peterson (2014). When an IAF is present the occurrence of audit reportable
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conditions is significantly higher (65%) than when an IAF is not present (35%) (χ2=48.780,
p<0.001). This result is inconsistent with my expectation in H1a. However, given that an IAF is
present, when the IAF has undergone an external assessment, there is a significantly lower
amount of audit reportable conditions (25%) than when no assessment has been completed
(75%) (χ2=11.186, p=0.001), consistent with the expectation of H2a. For control variables,
Big4Auditor (χ2=9.571, p=0.001), LowRiskAuditee (χ2=47.756, p<0.001), and OrgSize (T=7.292, p<0.001) are all negatively and significantly associated with the dependent variable
FSauditSDMW. ACPresent (χ2=4.057, p=0.022) and CouncilManager (χ2=6.353, p=0.006) are
both positively and significantly associated with FSauditSDMW. None of the other control
variables are significantly associated with FSauditSDMW.
[Insert Table 3 Here]
Restatements (Restatement). Table 4 contains descriptive statistics and univariate results
for the restatements dependent variable (Restatement). Overall 213 (23%) of the municipality
years have restatements, while 713 (77%) do not. When an IAF is present (IAFPresent) the
occurrence of restatements is significantly lower (18%) than when an IAF is not present (27%)
(χ2=10.562, p=0.001), in support of H1b. Also, given that an IAF is present, when the IAF has
undergone an external assessment (EQAIPPresentPrior), there is a no significant difference in
the occurrence of restatements (23%) than when no assessment has been completed (17%)
(χ2=1.421, p=0.117), providing no support for H2b. For control variables, GAAPState (χ2=1.889,
p=0.085) is negatively associated with the dependent variable Restatement at a marginally
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significant level. ACPresent (χ2=4.567, p=0.017) and CouncilManager (χ2=3.884, p=0.025) are
both positively and significantly associated with Restatement. None of the other control variables
are significantly associated with Restatement.
[Insert Table 4 Here]

Multivariate Analysis and Tests of Hypotheses
Correlation Matrix. Table 5 presents bivariate Pearson correlation coefficients between
all dependent and independent variables, where significant correlation coefficients are noted. The
independent variables IAFPresent and EQAIPPresentPrior have positive and significant
correlations with the dependent variable FSauditSDMW. IAFPresent has a negative and
significant correlation with Restatement, while EQAIPPresentPrior is not significantly correlated
with Restatement. While many other significant correlation coefficients between independent
variables are indicated in Table 5, only the correlation between OrgSize and IAFPresent exceeds
the critical level of 0.50, posing a potential multicollinearity problem. Thus, I drop OrgSize from
model. In additional analyses I replace IAFPresent in favor of OrgSize and then include both
OrgSize and IAFPresent.
[Insert Table 5 Here]
Audit Reportable Conditions (FSauditSDMW). Table 6 contains results from estimated
logistic regressions for the audit reportable conditions dependent variable FSauditSDMW. All
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models include all control variables, except OrgSize. Model 1a tests whether IAFPresent (H1a)
is negatively associated with FSauditSDMW. The model is highly significant (χ2=86.179,
p<0.001) with a Pseudo R2 of 12.50% and a classification accuracy of 66.90%. Consistent with
the descriptive results, it shows a positive and significant association between IAFPresent (β =
0.803, p<0.001) and FSauditSDMW, thus H1a is not supported. One control variable has a
negative and significant relationship with FSauditSDMW in this model, LowRiskAuditee
(β=-0.781, p=<0.001). This finding indicates that the presence of an IAF may help improve the
transparency of financial reporting by assisting both the external auditors and municipality
leaders discharge their duties of reporting accurately to their constituencies. It may also suggest
that IAFs of the public sector do not have the appropriate resources to install effective internal
controls over financial reporting. None of the other control variables is significant.
Mode 2a tests if EQAIPPresentPrior (H2a) is negatively associated with FSauditSDMW
when the municipality does have an IAF. The model is highly significant (χ2=49.236, p<0.001)
with a Pseudo R2 of 13.80% and a classification accuracy of 62.70%. There is a positive and
significant relationship between EQAIPPresentPrior (β =0.563, p=0.02) and FSauditSDMW
indicated by this model. Thus, H2a is not supported. However, this finding may indicate that
higher-quality IAFs may be better equipped to recognize and promote the appropriate disclosure
of internal control deficiencies.
Two control variables have negative relationships with FSauditSDMW in this model;
LowRiskAuditee (β=-0.652, p=0.002) and ACPresent (β=-0.311, p=0.098), both at marginally
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significant levels. Two control variables have a significant and positive relationships with
FSauditSDMW in this model; StateAuditor (β=1.443, p=0.003) and CouncilManager (β=11.834,
p<0.001). None of the other control variables is significant.
[Insert Table 6 Here]
Restatements (Restatement). Table 7 contains results from estimated logistic regressions
for the restatements dependent variable (Restatement). Both models include all control variables,
except OrgSize. Model 1b tests whether IAFPresent (H1b) is negatively associated with
Restatement. The model is highly significant (χ2=25.289, p=0.005) with a Pseudo R2 of 4.20%
and a classification accuracy of 76.70%. It shows a negative and significant association between
IAFPresent (β=-0.531 p=0.002) and Restatement, providing support for H1b. This suggests that
IAFs may help promote financial reporting quality by preventing and/or catching mistakes before
they become misstatements within the financial statements. Two control variables have a
positive relationship with Restatement, ACPresent (β=0.524, p=0.001) and CouncilManager
(β=0.242, p=0.071), at significant and marginally significant levels, respectively. None of the
other control variables is significant.
Mode 2b tests if EQAIPPresentPrior (H2b) is negatively associated with Restatement
when the municipality does have an IAF. The model is not significant (χ2=11.421, p=0.326) with
a Pseudo R2 of 4.00%, and a classification accuracy of 81.20%. There is not a significant
relationship between EQAIPPresentPrior (β=0.212, p=0.251) and Restatement indicated by this
model. Thus, there is no support for H2b. This, along with the finding that IAFPresent is
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negatively associated with Restatement may suggest that external reviews according to
government auditing standards are not stringent enough to promote IAF quality or that there is
not much variance in the quality of IAFs across municipalities, regardless of the presence of an
external review process. ACPresent (β=0.667, p=0.035) has a positive and significant
relationship with Restatement. None of the other control variables is significant.
[Insert Table 7 Here]

Additional Analyses
In the main models estimated above, OrgSize was dropped due to multicollinearity issues
with the independent variable IAFPresent. Additional were estimated that including both
IAFPresent and OrgSize. Related to H1a, when both IAFPresent and OrgSize are included in the
model, results remain largely the same. In this model both IAFPresent (β=0.659, p<0.001) and
OrgSize (β=0.194, p=0.031) have significant and positive relationships with FSauditSDMW.
When including OrgSize in model 2a, results also remain the same, as EQAIPPresentPrior
(β=2.647, p=052) remains positive, but at a marginally significant level. For the Restatements
analyses (models and hypotheses 1b and 2b), Results also remain largely unchanged. In model
1b, IAFPresent remains negative and significant (β=-0.476, p=0.01) and OrgSize (β=-0.74,
p=0.544) is negative and insignificant. In model 2b EQAIPPresentPrior remains insignificant
(β=0.248, p=0.218), while OrgSize is insignificant, (β=-0.209, p=0.154).
31

I also re-run analyses related to the Restatements dependent variables that include the
independent variables and OrgSize. The untabulated results remain largely unchanged from the
main analyses. Following this, I examine whether the independent variables are associated with
income increasing versus decreasing restatements (RestatementEffect), the absolute value of
restatements (ABSrestatement$), and the number of items errors that lead to restatements
(RestatementItemCount). IAFPresent has a negative and significant relationship with
RestatementItemCount and ABSrestatement$. It has not relationship with RestatementEffect.
EQAIPPresentPrior is not significant in any of these three models.
In a separate analysis, I examine the relationships between the independent variables and
each financial statement audit reportable conditions separately (material weakness, significant
deficiency, and material noncompliance). These variables are termed FSauditMW, FSauditSD,
and FSauditMNC, respectively. IAFPresent has a positive and significant relationship with
FSauditSD (β=0.798, p<0.001), but is insignificant in its relationship with both FSauditMW
(β=0.019, p=0.468) and FSauditMNC (β=0.291, p<0.259). EQAIPPresentPrior has a positive
and marginally significant relationship with FSauditSD (β =0.419, p<0.070), but is insignificant
in its relationship with both FSauditMW (β=0.006, p=0.424) and FSauditMNC (β =0.064,
p<0.457).
Finally, I run analyses to examine if there are relationships between the independent
variables and single audit reportable conditions, material weaknesses and significant deficiencies
(SAmpSDMW ). IAFPresent (β=0.828, p<0.001) has a positive and significant relationship with
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SAmpSDMW, while EQAIPPresentPrior (β=0.104, p=0.355) does not have a significant
relationship with SAmpSDMW.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Using a unique and hand-collected data set I examine the relationship of (1) the presence
of an IAF and (2) the use of quality assurance programs for the IAF with financial reporting
quality in public sector organizations. Specifically, this study investigates the association of the
presence of IAFs and the use of quality assessments therein with the occurrence of financial
statement audit reportable conditions and restatements in municipalities in the U.S. Results
should help improve our understanding of the IAFs contribution to financial reporting
transparency and quality.
Findings from data of U.S. municipalities with populations over 100,000 suggest a
positive and significant association of the presence of an IAF and use of IAF external quality
programs with financial statement audit reportable conditions related to internal control
(significant deficiencies). However, results also indicate that the presence of an IAF is negatively
associated with restatements. This may suggest that IAFs improve financial reporting
transparency through proper disclosure of audit reportable conditions, and also at the same time
help promote accurate financial accounting and reporting. Further research is necessary to
understand these findings and examine why IAFs seemingly do not prevent audit reportable
conditions. The use of quality assurance programs (primarily according to government auditing
standards) for the IAF has no effect on restatements. Overall findings may suggest that regulators
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may wish to examine and update rules around Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAGS),
especially those specific to IAF peer reviews.
Results related to the study’s control variables find that municipalities opined to be low
risk encounter significantly fewer financial statement audit reportable conditions while larger
municipalities have significantly fewer audit reportable conditions, but see no difference in
restatements. Finally, the presence of an audit committee is positively and significantly
associated with restatements. All other controls have either mixed or insignificant results.
Future research opportunities are available due to the limitations of the current study.
First, the study uses the presence of external assessments of IAFs as a proxy for IAF quality.
Future research may want to collect larger sample sizes on external assessments (and variation
therein) or IAF quality variables and assess their effects on financial reporting therein. Second,
the time consuming nature of hand collecting data on municipalities limited my sample to 100 of
the 326 municipalities with populations of greater than 100,000. Future research can use this as a
hold out sample and collect additional data from the remaining municipalities to investigate the
issues further. Third, this study focuses on one public sector entity, municipalities. Future
research may consider alternative types of public sector organizations, such as public
colleges/universities, not-for-profit organizations, and state-level entities. Finally, the data
collected does not allow for the analysis to include the size of the IAF relative to the
municipality, thus omitting IAF resources as a variable. Future research may be able to account
for IAF size relative to the municipality to determine if there is a resource allocation issue.
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While this study has limitations and unexpected results, it increases our understanding of
the variables that influence financial reporting quality in the public sector and raises interesting
questions for future research to consider. The results should be of interest to regulators and
public-sector leaders as they consider ways to improve financial reporting quality in government
entities.

35

REFERENCES
Abbott, L. J., S. Parker, and G. F. Peters. 2004. Audit Committee Characteristics and
Restatements. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory. 23(1): 69-87.
Abdolmohammadi, M. J., P. Burnaby and S. Hass. 2006. The Americas literature review on
internal auditing. Managerial Auditing Journal 21(8): 835-844.
Alt, J., E. Bueno de Mesquita, and S. Rose. 2011. Disentangling Accountability and Competence
in Elections: Evidence from U.S. Term Limits. The Journal of Politics. 73(01): 171-86.
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). 1997. The Auditor's Consideration
of the Internal Audit Function in an Audit of Financial Statements. Statement on Auditing
Standards No. 65. Available at:
http://www.aicpa.org/Research/Standards/AuditAttest/DownloadableDocuments/AU00322.pdf.
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). 2014. SAS No. 128 (Au-C Section
610): Using the Work of Internal Auditors. Available at:
http://www.aicpa.org/interestareas/centerforplainenglishaccounting/news/2014/pages/sasno128-using-internal-auditors.aspx.
Arena, M., and G. Azzone. 2009. Identifying Organizational Drivers of Internal Audit
Effectiveness. International Journal of Auditing. 13(1): 43-60.
Baber, W. R., and A. K. Gore. 2008. Consequences of Gaap Disclosure Regulation: Evidence
from Municipal Debt Issues. The Accounting Review. 83(3): 565-92.
Baber, W. R., A. K. Gore, K. T. Rich, and J. X. Zhang. 2013a. Accounting Restatements,
Governance and Municipal Debt Financing. Journal of Accounting and Economics.
56(2): 212-27.
Baber, W. R., S.-H. Kang, L. Liang, and Z. Zhu. 2013b. External Corporate Governance and
Misreporting. Georgetown McDonough School of Business Research Paper(760324).
Bame-Aldred, C., D. Brandon, W. Messier Jr., L. Rittenberg, and C. Stefanik. 2013. A Summary
of Research on External Auditor Reliance on the Internal Audit Function. Auditing: A
Journal of Practice & Theory. 32(Supplement 1): 251-86.
Beaver, W. H. Financial Reporting: An Accounting Revolution. Edited by: Prentice Hall, 1981.
Blokdijk, H., F. Drieenhuizen, and D. A. Simunic. 2006. An Analysis of Cross-Sectional
Differences in Big and Non-Big Public Accounting Firms’ Audit Programs. . Auditing.
25(1): 27-48.
Carcello, J. V., D. R. Hermanson, and K. Raghunandan. 2005. Changes in Internal Auditing
During the Time of the Major U.S. Accounting Scandals. International Journal of
Auditing. 9(2): 117-27.
Carcello, J. V., D. R. Hermanson, and Z. Ye. 2011. Corporate Governance Research in
Accounting and Auditing: Insights, Practice Implications, and Future Research
Directions. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory. 30(3): 1-31.
36

Carhill, K.M., Kincaid, J.K. 1989 “Applying the Standards in Governmental Internal Auditing”,
The Internal Auditor, 52 (6): 63-65.
CBOK. 2010. Common Body of Knowledge in Internal Auditing. Altamonte Springs, FL: The
Institute of Internal Auditors Research Foundation.
Center for Audit Quality. 2014. Caq Approach to Audit Quality Indicators. Available at:
http://www.thecaq.org/docs/reports-and-publications/caq-approach-to-audit-qualityindicators-april-2014.pdf?sfvrsn=2.
Cohen, J., G. Krishnamoorthy, and A. Wright. 2004. The Corporate Governance Mosaic and
Financial Reporting Quality. Journal of Accounting Literature: 87-152.
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO). 2013. Internal
Control - Integrated Framework. Available at: http://www.ic.coso.org/IC.htm.
Copley, P. A. 1992. The Association between Municipal Disclosure Practices and Audit Quality.
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy. 10(4): 245-66.
Costello, A. M., and R. Wittenberg-Moerman. 2011. The Impact of Financial Reporting Quality
on Debt Contracting: Evidence from Internal Control Weakness Reports. Journal of
Accounting Research. 49(1): 97-136.
Coupland, D. 1993. "The Internal Auditor's Role in Public Service Orientation", Managerial
Auditing Journal, 8 (1): 3-13.
Dechow, P. M., R. G. Sloan, and A. P. Sweeney. 1996. Causes and Consequences of Earnings
Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the Sec.
Contemporary Accounting Research. 13(1): 1-36.
Ege, M. S. 2015. Does Internal Audit Function Quality Deter Management Misconduct? The
Accounting Review. 90(2): 495-97.
Eshleman, J. D., and P. Guo. 2014. Do Big 4 Auditors Provide Higher Audit Quality after
Controlling for the Endogenous Choice of Auditor? Auditing: A Journal of Practice &
Theory. 33(4): 197-219.
Evans, J. H., and J. M. Patton. 1983. An Economic Analysis of Participation in the Municipal
Finance Officers Association Certificate of Conformance Program. Journal of
Accounting and Economics. 5: 151-75.
Evans, J. H., and J. M. Patton. 1987. Signaling and Monitoring in Public-Sector Accounting.
Journal of Accounting Research: 130-58.
Felix Jr., W. L., and A. A. Gramling. 2001. The Contribution of Internal Audit as a Determinant
of External Audit Fees and Factors Influencing This Contribution. Journal of Accounting
Research. 39(3): 513-34.
Francis, J. R. 2004. What Do We Know About Audit Quality? The British Accounting Review.
36(4): 345-68.
Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB). 1999. Gasb Statement No. 34: Basic
Financial Statements—and Management's Discussion and Analysis—for State and Local
Governments. Available at:
37

http://www.gasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobkey=id&blobwhere=1175824063624&blobhead
er=application%2Fpdf&blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs.
Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB). 2007. GASB Research Brief: State and
Local Government Use of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles for General
Purpose External Financial Reporting. Available at:
http://gasb.org/resources/ccurl/336/337/GAAP_Research_Brief.pdf.
Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA). 2008. GFOA Recommended Practice on
Audit Committees. Available at: http://www.gfoa.org/audit-committees.
Gramling, A. A., and P. M. Myers. 2006. Internal Auditing's Role in Erm. The Internal Auditor.
63(2): 52-56.
Grant Thornton LLP. 2013. Comment Letter Re: File Number Sr-Nasdaq-2013-032. Available
at: http://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-nasdaq-2013-032/nasdaq2013032-29.pdf.
Greenblatt, A. 2005. Paradise Insolvent. Governing the States and Localities.19(2) 41-46,
Available at: http://www.governing.com/topics/politics/Paradise-Insolvent.html.
Healy, P. M., and K. G. Palepu. 2001. Information Asymmetry, Corporate Disclosure, and the
Capital Markets: A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature. Journal of Accounting
and Economics. 31(1): 405-40.
Hood, C. 1989. Public Administration and Public Policy: Intellectual Challenges for the 1990s.
Australian Journal of Public Administration. 48(4): 346-358.
Hood, C.1991. A public management for all seasons? Public Administration 69(1): 3-19.
Kinney Jr, W. R., Z. V. Palmrose, and S. Scholz. 2004. Auditor Independence, Non‐Audit
Services, and Restatements: Was the U.S, Government Right? Journal of Accounting
Research. 42(3): 561-88.
Krishnan, G. V., and G. Visvanathan. 2007. Reporting Internal Control Deficiencies in the Post‐
Sarbanes‐Oxley Era: The Role of Auditors and Corporate Governance. International
Journal of Auditing. 11(2): 73-90.
Larcker, D. F., S. A. Richardson, and I. r. Tuna. 2007. Corporate Governance, Accounting
Outcomes, and Organizational Performance. The Accounting Review. 82(4): 963-1008.
Lin, S., M. Pizzini, M. Vargus, and I. R. Bardhan. 2011. The Role of the Internal Audit Function
in the Disclosure of Material Weaknesses. The Accounting Review. 86(1): 287-323.
Martinez, J., D. Osborne, and T. Gaebler. 1993. Reinventing Government: How the
Entrepreneurial Spirit Is Transforming the Public Sector. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Mihret, D. G., and M. A. Admassu. 2011. Reliance of External Auditors on Internal Audit Work:
A Corporate Governance Perspective. International Business Research. 4(2): p67.
Mihret, D. G., and A. W. Yismaw. 2007. Internal Audit Effectiveness: An Ethiopian Public
Sector Case Study. Managerial Auditing Journal. 22(5): 470-84.
Morgan, G., Campbell, J., Crouch, C., Pedersen, O. K. and Whitley, R. (2010) ‘Introduction’.
The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Institutional Analysis, Oxford, Oxford University
Press. 1–14.
38

National Center for Education Statistics. 2015. College Navigator - Public 4 Year Universities by
Student Population. Available at:
http://nces.ed.gov/collegenavigator/default.aspx?s=all&l=93&ct=1&ic=1&xp=1
NYSE. 2003. Final Nyse Corporate Governance Rules. Available at:
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/finalcorpgovrules.pdf.
Office of Management and Budget (OMB). 2003a. Circular A-133. Available at:
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/circulars/a133/a133.html.
Office of Management and Budget (OMB). 2003b. Circular A-133; Subpart E – Auditors;
(§___.500); Scope of Audit. Available at:
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/circulars/a133/a133.html.
Office of Management and Budget (OMB). 2003c. Circular a-133; Subpart E – Auditors;
(§___.530); Criteria for a Low-Risk Auditee. Available at:
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/circulars/a133/a133.html.
Palmrose, Z.-V., V. J. Richardson, and S. Scholz. 2004. Determinants of Market Reactions to
Restatement Announcements. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 37(1): 59-89.
Peterson, A. N. 2014. The Impact of Municipal Governance on Cities' Audit Outcomes. Working
Paper.
Pollitt, C. 1995. Justification by Works or by Faith? Evaluating the New Public Management.
Evaluation, 1(2): 133-154.
Pollitt, C. 2002. Clarifying Convergence. Striking similarities and durable differences in public
management reform. Public Management Review. 4(1): 471-492.
Management Review, Vol. 4, N°. 1, p. 471-492.Prawitt, D. F., N. Y. Sharp, and D. A. Wood.
2012. Internal Audit Outsourcing and the Risk of Misleading or Fraudulent Financial
Reporting: Did Sarbanes-Oxley Get It Wrong? Contemporary Accounting Research.
29(4): 1109-36.
Prawitt, D. F., N. Y. Sharp, and D. A. Wood. 2011. Reconciling Archival and Experimental
Research: Does Internal Audit Contribution Affect the External Audit Fee? Behavioral
Research in Accounting. 23(2): 187-206.
Prawitt, D. F., J. L. Smith, and D. A. Wood. 2009. Internal Audit Quality and Earnings
Management. The Accounting Review. 84(4): 1255-80.
Protiviti. 2008. Internal Auditing in Higher Education - Profiles of Top Performers. Available at:
http://www.protiviti.com/en-US/Documents/Resource-Guides/ia_higher_education.pdf.
Rich, K. T., and J. X. Zhang. 2014. Does Audit Committee Monitoring Matter in the
Government Sector? Evidence from Municipal Internal Control Quality. Journal of
Governmental & Nonprofit Accounting. 3(1): 58-80.
Sarens, G., and M. J. Abdolmohammadi. 2011. Monitoring Effects of the Internal Audit
Function: Agency Theory Versus Other Explanatory Variables. International Journal of
Auditing. 15: 1-20.

39

Securities and Exchange Commission. 2013a. Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to
Require That Listed Companies Have an Internal Audit Function. Release No. 34-69030.
Available at: http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nasdaq/2013/34-69030.pdf.
Securities and Exchange Commission. 2013b. Notice of Withdrawal of Proposed Rule Change to
Require That Listed Companies Have an Internal Audit Function. Release No 34-69792.
Available at: http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nasdaq/2013/34-69792.pdf.
Sterck, M. and Bouckaert, G. (2006). International audit trends in the public sector. The Internal
Auditor. August: 49-53.
Sterck, M., Scheers, B., and G. Bouckaert. 2005. The Modernization of the Public Control
Pyramid: International Trends. Report from the research group financial management,
performance measurement and performance management. Leuven: Policy Research
Centre – Governmental organization in Flanders
Svara, J. H. 2002. The Roles of the City Council and Implications for the Structure of City
Government. National Civic Review. 91(1): 5-23.
The Institute of Internal Auditors. 2007. IIA Standard 1312 - External Quality Assessments:
Results, Tools, Techniques, and Lessons Learned. Available at:
http://www.theiia.org/bookstore/downloads/freetomembers/0_2001_external%20quality
%20assessments.pdf.
The Institute of Internal Auditors. 2012a. IIA Standards & Guidance — International
Professional Practices Framework (IPPF). Available at: http://na.theiia.org/standardsguidance/pages/standards-and-guidance-ippf.aspx.
The Institute of Internal Auditors. 2012b. IPPF Practice Guide - Quality Assurance and
Improvement Program. Available at: http://www.iia.org.au/sf_docs/defaultsource/quality/practice-guide-quality-assurance-and-improvement-program.pdf?sfvrsn=2.
The Institute of Internal Auditors. 2012c. Quality Assessment Manual for the Internal Audit
Activity - Tool 19 - Standards Compliance Evaluation Summary available at:
http://na.theiia.org/services/quality/Pages/Quality-Assessment-Manual.aspx.
The Institute of Internal Auditors. 2012d. The Role of Auditing in Public Sector Governance.
Available at: http://na.theiia.org/standardsguidance/Public%20Documents/Public_Sector_Governance1_1_.pdf.
The Institute of Internal Auditors. 2012e. Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal
Auditing (Standards). Available at: http://na.theiia.org/standardsguidance/Public%20Documents/IPPF%202013%20English.pdf.
The Institute of Internal Auditors. 2012f. Supplemental Guidance: IIA International Standards
for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing Government Accountability Office
Government Audit Standards (GAGAS): A Comparison. Available at:
https://acga.theiia.org/guid/Documents/IIA%20International%20Standards%20and%20G
overnment%20Audit%20Standards%20(GAGAS)%20%20A%20Comparison,%202nd%20Edition.pdf.
40

The World Bank (2015). The World Bank Indicators. Expense (% of GDP). Washington, DC:
The World Bank Group. Available at:
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GC.XPN.TOTL.GD.ZS
United States Census Bureau. 2013. U.S. Census Subcounty Population Estimates 2013.
Available at: https://www.census.gov/popest/data/cities/totals/2013/.
United States Congress. 1996. Single Audit Act Amendments of 1996. PUBLIC LAW 104–156.
Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/about_omb/104156.pdf
United States Congress. 1984. Single Audit Act of 1984. PUBLIC LAW 98-502. Available at:
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-98/pdf/STATUTE-98-Pg2327.pdf
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). 1998. The Value of Municipal Audit
Committees. GAO Journal. No. 3. Available at: http://gao.gov/products/137165.
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). 1999. Government Auditing Standards:
Amendment No. 2: Auditor Communication. Available at:
http://gao.gov/assets/200/199835.pdf.
Governmental Accountability Office (GAO). 2011. Government Accounting Standards.
Available at: http://www.gao.gov/yellowbook/overview.
van Gils, D. 2012. The development of internal auditing within belgian public entities: A neoinstitutional and new public management perspective. Dissertation: Université
Catholique de Louvain. Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium.
Zain, M. M., N. Subramaniam, and J. Stewart. 2006. Internal Auditors’ Assessment of Their
Contribution to Financial Statement Audits: The Relation with Audit Committee and
Internal Audit Function Characteristics. International Journal of Auditing. 10(1): 1-18.

41

Table 1
Sample by State
State
ARIZONA
CALIFORNIA
COLORADO
CONNECTICUT
FLORIDA
IDAHO
ILLINOIS
INDIANA
IOWA
KANSAS
LOUISIANA
MICHIGAN
MINNESOTA
MISSOURI
NEVADA
NEW HAMPSHIRE
NEW JERSEY
NEW YORK
NORTH CAROLINA
NORTH DAKOTA
OHIO
OKLAHOMA
OREGON
PENNSYLVANIA
TENNESSEE
TEXAS
UTAH
VIRGINIA
WASHINGTON
WISCONSIN
TOTALS

GAAP State?
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

Unique Municipalities
4
24
3
1
7
1
6
3
1
2
2
2
2
1
2
1
1
6
3
1
3
2
1
3
2
11
1
1
2
1
100
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Municipalities Years
37
227
25
10
70
10
56
28
7
20
20
19
20
11
21
10
3
46
25
10
28
21
10
28
22
96
11
11
14
10
926

TABLE 2
Variable Definitions
Variable Name

Variable Description

Definition

Financial Statement Internal
Control MW or SD

1 if MW/SD present,
0 if not

Restatement

1 if restatement is present, 0 if not

Presence of Internal Audit Function

1 if IAF is present, 0 if not

EQAIPPresentPrior

External Quality Assessment in
Current/any Prior Year

GAAPState
Big4Auditor
StateAuditor

State GAAP Requirements
External Auditor Type
State or CPA firm Auditor

LowRiskAuditee
ACPresent
CouncilManager

Entity deemed Low risk Audit
Presence of an Audit Committee
Form of Government

Staggered

Staggered council election

TermLimit

Term limit for Council

1 if EQAIP in current/any prior year,
0 if not
1 if GAAP requirements in state,
0 if not
1 if Big 4 auditor, 0 if not
1 if State Auditor, 0 if not
1 if the entity is classified as a lowrisk audit by auditor,
0 if not
1 if AC present, 0 if not
1 if council-manager, 0 if other
1 if staggered city council election,
0 if not
1 if term limits for city council,
0 if not
1 if the finance official is elected,
0 if appointed
Log of net assets

FSauditSDMW
(H1a + H2a)
Restatement
(H1b + H2b)
IAFPresent

ElectedFinanceOfficial Finance Official status
Organization Size
OrgSize
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Data Source
AuditAnalytics.com
Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports
Municipality website
Municipality website
GASB.org
AuditAnalytics.com
AuditAnalytics.com
AuditAnalytics.com
Municipality website
Municipality website
Municipality website
Municipality website
Municipality website
Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports

TABLE 3
Descriptive and Univariate Statistics
Dependent Variable: Does the municipality have any financial statement significant deficiency (SD) or
material weakness (MW) (FSauditSDMW)?
Yes
Expected
No: 558
Yes: 338
Independent Variable
or
Statistic
Significanceb
Sign
(62%)
(38%)
No?
No
328
59%
117 35% 2
IAFPresent (H1a)
χ =48.780
<0.001
Yes
231
41%
221 65%
No
201
87%
165 75% 2
EQAIPPresentPrior (H2a)
χ =11.186
0.001
Yes
30
13%
56 25%
No
360
64%
231 68% 2
GAAPState
χ =1.457
0.114
Yes
199
36%
107 32%
No
508
91%
284 84% 2
Big4Auditor
χ =9.571
+/0.001
Yes
51
9%
54 16%
StateAuditor

+/-

LowRiskAuditee

-

ACPresent

-

CouncilManager
Staggered
TermLimit
ElectedFinanceOfficial

+/+/+/-

OrgSize
+/a

No

529

Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Mean
Std.
Dev.

30
5%
180
32%
379
68%
250
45%
309
55%
228
41%
331
59%
90
16%
469
84%
289
52%
270
48%
494
88%
65
12%
12.23
0.88

95%

320

95%

18
5%
188 56%
150 44%
128 38%
210 62%
167 49%
171 51%
96 28%
242 72%
166 49%
172 51%
288 85%
50 15%
12.69
0.97

χ2=0.001

0.979

χ2=47.756

<0.001

χ2=4.057

0.022

χ2=6.353

0.006

χ2=19.396

<0.001

χ2=0.564

0.453

χ2=1.888

0.169

T=-7.292

<0.001

See variable definitions in Table 1.

b

One-tailed for variables with an expected sign of -, two-tailed for variables with an expected sign of +/-.
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TABLE 4
Descriptive and Univariate Statistics
Dependent Variable: Does the municipality have a restatement (Restatement)?
Yes
Expected
No: 713
Yes: 213
Independent Variablea
or
Statistic
Significanceb
Sign
(77%)
(23%)
No?
No
338 73% 128 27% 2
IAFPresent (H1b)
χ =10.562
0.001
Yes
375 82% 85 18%
No
307 83% 65 17% 2
EQAIPPresentPrior (H2b)
χ =1.421
0.117
Yes
67 77% 20 23%
No
466 76% 150 24% 2
GAAPState
χ =1.889
0.085
Yes
247 80% 63 20%
No
601 76% 191 24% 2
Big4Auditor
χ =2.523
0.112
+/Yes
87 83% 18 17%
StateAuditor
LowRiskAuditee
ACPresent
CouncilManager
Staggered
TermLimit
ElectedFinanceOfficial

+/+/+/+/-

OrgSize
+/a

No

651

77% 198

23%

Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Mean
Std.
Dev.

37 77%
283 77%
405 77%
320 80%
393 74%
329 80%
384 75%
155 78%
558 77%
364 77%
349 77%
624 77%
89 77%
12.40

11 23%
85 23%
124 23%
78 20%
135 26%
82 20%
131 25%
44 22%
169 23%
106 23%
107 23%
186 23%
27 23%
12.30

0.97

0.81

χ2=0.004

0.949

χ2=0.014

0.453

χ2=4.567

0.017

χ2=3.884

0.025

χ2=0.114

0.736

χ2=0.109

0.742

χ2=0.006

0.940

T=1.420

0.156

See variable definitions in Table 1.

b

One-tailed for variables with an expected sign of -, two-tailed for variables with an expected sign of +/-.
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TABLE 5
Pearson Correlation Matrix
Variablea

a

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

1

FSauditSDMW

2

Restatement

-.031

3

IAFPresent

.233**

4

EQAIPPresentPrior

.157**

.056

.051

1

5

GAAPState

-.040

-.045

.105**

-.063

1

6

Big4Auditor

.103**

-.053

.243**

-.025

.016

1

7

StateAuditor

-.001

-.002

-.051

.036

-.004

-.087**

1

8

LowRiskAuditee

-.231**

.004

-.207**

-.197**

.136**

-.112**

.067*

1

9

ACPresent

.067*

.070*

.230**

.183**

.075*

.128**

-.018

-.106**

1

-.084*

.065*

-.238**

-.012

-.039

-.040

-.118**

.178**

-.038

1

-.258**

-.181**

.081*

-.190**

-.123**

.211**

-.136**

.289**

12

13

14

1
1
-.107**

1

10

CouncilManager

11

Staggered

-.147**

.011

12

TermLimit

.025

.011

.015

.105*

.047

.113**

-.135**

-.121**

.087**

.010

-0.063

1

13

ElectedFinanceOfficial

.046

.002

0.061

.257**

-.199**

.026

-.091**

-.087**

.118**

-.148**

-.120**

-.079*

1

14

OrgSize

.237**

-.047

.531**

.207**

-.048

.361**

-.043

-.367**

.343**

-.145**

-.314**

.163**

.189**

See variable definitions in Table 1.

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).

46

1

1

TABLE 6
Dependent Variable: Does the municipality have any financial statement significant deficiency (SD)
or material weakness (MW) (FSauditSDMW)?

FSauditSDMW
(Model 1a)
Independent Variablea

Expected
Sign

IAFPresent (H1a)
EQAIPPresentPrior (H1b)
GAAPState
Big4Auditor
StateAuditor
LowRiskAuditee
ACPresent
CouncilManager
Staggered
TermLimit
ElectedFinanceOfficial
Chi-Square (Sig.)
Classification

+/+/+/+/+/-

β
0.803

Sig.b

24.321

<0.001

β

Wald

Sig.b

-0.126
0.610
0.218
0.214
0.877
0.349
0.212
0.412
0.521
-0.781 25.972 <0.001
-0.031
0.041
0.420
0.051
0.101
0.375
-0.237
1.473
0.225
-0.012
0.007
0.935
0.071
0.096
0.757
86.179 (<0.001)
66.90%

0.563
4.224
0.020
-0.319
1.995
0.079
0.396
2.377
0.123
1.443
8.585
0.003
-0.652
8.561
0.002
-0.311
1.671
0.098
0.808 11.834 <0.001
-0.345
1.853
0.173
-0.034
0.025
0.875
0.455
1.689
0.194
49.236 (<0.001)
62.70%

12.50%

13.80%

Nagelkerke Pseudo R2
a

Wald

FSauditSDMW
(Model 2a)

See variable definitions in Table 1.

b

One-tailed for variables with an expected sign of -, two-tailed for variables with an expected sign of +/-.
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TABLE 7
Dependent Variable: Does the municipality have a restatement (Restatement)?

Restatement
(Model 1b)
Independent Variablea

Expected
Sign

IAFPresent (H1b)
EQAIPPresentPrior (H2b)
GAAPState
Big4Auditor
StateAuditor
LowRiskAuditee
ACPresent
CouncilManager
Staggered
TermLimit
ElectedFinanceOfficial
Chi-Square (Sig.)
Classification

+/+/+/+/+/-

β

Wald

-0.531

-0.190
1.090
-0.347
1.445
0.021
0.003
-0.076
0.194
0.524
9.213
0.262
2.165
-0.065
0.083
0.098
0.347
-0.005
0.000
25.289 (0.005)
76.70%

Nagelkerke Pseudo R2
a

8.340

4.20%

Restatement
(Model 2b)
Sig.b

β

Wald

Sig.b

0.002
0.148
0.229
0.956
0.330
0.001
0.071
0.774
0.556
0.984

0.212
0.452
-0.122
0.188
-0.375
1.231
0.374
0.544
-0.021
0.006
0.575
3.384
0.278
0.929
-0.500
2.599
-0.201
0.535
-0.351
0.656
11.421 (0.326)
81.20%

0.251
0.333
0.267
0.461
0.470
0.033
0.168
0.107
0.464
0.418

4.00%

See variable definitions in Table 1.

b

One-tailed for variables with an expected sign of -, two-tailed for variables with an expected sign of +/-.
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